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1 Introduction
Using data for adults from 122 countries, Hallal et al (2012) recently revealed that,
worldwide, 31.1% of adults are physically inactive, with proportions ranging from 17%
in southeast Asia to around 43% in the Americas and the eastern Mediterranean. Inac-
tivity rises with age, is higher in women than in men, and is increased in high-income
countries. These constitute unfavorable statistics from a public health perspective since
physical inactivity is, respectively, the fourth and fifth leading cause of death and dis-
ability worldwide. Lee et al (2012) quantify the ill-effects of inactivity and show that
it caused 9% of premature mortality or more than 5.3 million of the 57 million deaths
that occurred worldwide in 2008.1
People benefit from even modest physical activity (PA): compared with inactive
individuals, those who were active about 90 minutes per week lived three years longer
(see Wen et al, 2011). Moreover, the practice of PA decreases not only the prevalence
of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) but also long term care (LTC) dependency.2 In
fact, physically active older adults are also more likely to perform better Instrumental
Activities of Daily Living and Activities of Daily Living, to have a better functional
health, lower risk of falling, and better cognitive function. PA delays entrance into
dependency by six to seven years (see Shephard, 1991), and clearly has vast potential to
improve health throughout the world. For its general health benefits and the potential
decrease of health care costs, PA promotion is now a priority for governments and
health agencies.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the effects of PA encouragement policies, such
as uniform mass media campaigns, enhancing the social determinants of PA practice.
To this end, we consider a community which is composed of two types of individuals
who differ in their concern for PA. Additionally, we consider “social multiplier” effects
in PA practice and, in particular, we assume that the marginal productivity of PA
is increasing in the aggregated amount invested by the community. Social multiplier
1This figure equates to as many deaths as tobacco causes globally.
2See the survey of Blain et al. (2000), and the references therein.
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effects have been recently used to explain topics as diverse as criminal activity (Glaeser
et al, 1996), welfare state participation (Bertrand et al, 2000), school achievement
(Sacerdote, 2001), participation in retirement plans (Saez and Duflo, 2003), work and
leisure (Alesina et al, 2005), and obesity (Trogdon et al, 2008). Note that an externality
emerges since individuals do not account for the effect of their choices on the social
multiplier effect, and hence on others’ utility. Consequently, individual choices will not
be optimal and there is therefore scope for government intervention.
Policies to promote PA are numerous and have been recently surveyed by Kohl et
al (2012). Among theses policies, the informational approaches of community-wide
and mass media campaigns, and short PA messages targeting key community sites are
recommended (see the recent survey of Heath et al, 2012). In fact, while PA is globally
accepted as health-enhancing for the full range of individuals’ health statuses, less
consensus exists regarding whether or not PA promoting policies should be publicized
and implemented. For example, there is some discussion concerning the messages used
to change PA behavior; in particular, whether those emphasizing the benefits of being
active are more or less effective than those emphasizing the consequences of inactivity
(see Latimer et al, 2010, or Gallagher and Updegraff, 2012).
We abstract from the implementation dimension of the problem and focus solely on
PA recommendation policies, since we want to assess the relevance of the uniform PA
recommendations presently used worldwide within mass media campaigns. Examples
of such campaigns are the “Let’s Move - Get Active” in the US, “Manger-Bouger” in
France, “Find thirty every day” in Australia advising adults to do 30 minutes of daily
moderate PA, and the “Change4life-150 minutes” of weekly PA in the UK.3 Importantly,
the design of recommendations crucially depends on whether or not the government
observes individuals’ concerns for PA. When this is not observable, we suppose that
3For more on these campaigns check, respectively, http://www.letsmove.gov/get-active,
www.mangerbouger.fr, www.findthirtyeveryday.com.au, and http://www.nhs.uk/Change4Life, all ac-
cessed on September 25, 2012. Similarly, there are uniform campaigns concerning nutrition, in general
advising the intake of five portions of fruit and vegetables a day.
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the government implements a uniform policy. On the contrary, when this is observable,
the government implements the First Best equilibrium.
The novelty of our approach is to take into account the peer effects existing in
PA practice. Research suggests that the attitude of children and adolescents towards
PA greatly depends on their parents’ and peers’ attitudes, as well as on their overall
school environment (see among others, Eder and Parker, 1987, Wechsler et al, 2000,
Smith, 2003, Voorhees et al, 2005, Robbins et al, 2008, Efrat, 2009, Babcock and
Hartman, 2010, or Carrell et al, 2011). Additionally, according to a recent OECD
(2010, p. 18) recommendation, “in the design and implementation of prevention policies
special attention must be placed on the role of information, externalities and self-control
issues, including the role of social multiplier effects (the clustering and spread within
households and social networks).” What is more, researchers put forward whether or
not it is the social contact inherent within PA programs for the elderly that creates a
positive relationship between PA and cognition (see for example Renaud and Bherer,
2005). In their recent survey concerning PA in old age, Hirvensalo and Lintunen (2011,
p. 18) conclude that, “the studies reviewed also highlighted the importance of social
networks in maintaining participation.” We incorporate this social dimension of PA
into our model by assuming that individuals’ benefit from PA is increasing in the
aggregate average of PA in society.
In a setting with two types of individuals as regards their concern for PA, we
contrast the Laissez Faire equilibrium with two government policies. In Section 2, we
first assume that the government cannot observe types, defined as different preferences
regarding PA, and enforces a uniform PA level (hereafter Government equilibrium).
In Section 3, we then suppose that types are observable and therefore the government
can implement the First Best. In this case, types may be interpreted as heterogenous
PA benefits driven from different individual health conditions (or alternatively, age or
gender). In fact, according to the medical literature, a lower level of PA is needed for
the elderly, or for any individual with a low exercise capacity, if health risks are to be
reduced. Also, while 30 to 60 minutes per day of moderate to vigorous intensity PA
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may be needed to decrease the risk of developing breast and colon cancers, 30 minutes
of moderate intensity exercise five days per week reduces the risk of type-2 diabetes by
25% to 36% (see PAGAC, 2008).4 Still, government PA campaigns recommend uniform
PA practice or, at most, provide different advice for children and adults.
We find that at the Laissez Faire PA individual choices are increasing in their
concern for PA and in the social multiplier, as expected. The uniform government
PA recommendation is above both types’ individual choices if the social multiplier is
high enough. Also, a uniform policy may improve the welfare of individuals the most
concerned with PA, even when it reduces their level of PA. Indeed they benefit from
the multiplicative effect of the increase in PA of individuals the least concerned with
PA. Yet, the most unexpected result is that the welfare of the individuals the least
concerned with PA may decrease in the social multiplier if they are not too numerous.
This result is surprising because the direct effect of the social multiplier is a utility
increase. However, such direct effect is dominated by the effect of imposing a too
high level of PA, which results from a higher weight being given to the preference of
individuals the most concerned with PA (a large number), to the detriment of those
the least concerned with PA.
In contrast to the uniform policy, we find that the First Best PA recommendations
are always above individuals’ decisions, for all strengths of the social multiplier. Also,
for individuals the most (resp: least) concerned with PA, the government recommenda-
tion is larger (resp: lower) than the uniform one. While the welfare of individuals the
most concerned with PA increases in the social multiplier, the welfare of individuals
the least concerned with PA may decrease in it. Therefore such a decrease is not due to
the uniformity of the government intervention. Whatever their proportion, individuals
4See among others, Warburton et al (2006), regarding PA benefits in reducing the risk of several
conditions, Barnett et al (2003) for reduction in falls and disability, Keysor (2003) for improved
independence, McAuley et al (2005) for improved psychological well-being, and Colcombe and Kramer
(2003), and the survey of Vogel et al (2009) for maintenance of cognitive vitality. Yet note that PA
is recommended to all ages since the risk of NCDs starts in childhood (see Warburton et al, 2006,
PAGAC, 2008, and WHO, 2010, among others).
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the most concerned with PA are better off at the Government equilibrium rather than
at the First Best for a sufficiently high social multiplier.
Finally, for a sufficiently high social multiplier, both government interventions im-
prove the welfare of the most concerned with PA but worsen the welfare of the least
concerned individuals if they are not too many. More precisely, compared to the First
Best, a uniform recommendation improves the welfare of those most concerned with
PA more than it reduces the welfare of those least concerned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our framework
and contrast the Laissez Faire and Government equilibria. In Section 3 we contrast the
First Best, where types are observable to the Laissez Faire and Government equilibria.
A final section concludes. Proofs are gathered in the Appendices.
2 The standard framework and uniform policy advice
The economy is composed of individuals and the government. Individuals live for one
period of time, of length normalized to 1, and they differ according to their concern α
for PA. Indeed, we suppose the community to be composed of a fraction p ∈ (0, 1) of
individuals with a concern αA and 1− p with a concern αB.
Assumption 1. 1/2 ≤ αB < αA ≤ 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that type A individuals have a greater con-
cern for PA than type B individuals. The assumption 1/2 < αB can be relaxed but it
guarantees that our results are not due to the use of exotic frameworks with huge het-
erogeneity. In particular, assuming a sufficiently large concern for PA ensures equilibria
with positive levels of PA.
Individuals of type i (i = A or B) care about consumption ci and PA θi. They care
about PA because it is good for their health and because they enjoy it.5 The basic
starting point of a social multiplier model is to assume that the marginal productivity
5These variables θi can alternatively be either a time or an amount of wealth devoted to PA.
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of PA is increasing in the amount chosen by one’s peers. Then, as in Alesina et al
(2005), we assume that utility is separable so that individuals maximize:
Ui = U(ci) + αiH(θi, θ̂)
where θ̂ is the average amount of PA within the community. We assume H1(θi, θ̂) > 0,
H11(θi, θ̂) < 0, and H12(θi, θ̂) > 0. In other words, PA increases health but at a
decreasing rate, and the cross-partial reflects an increase in well-being driven from
social interactions taking place during PA.
In contrast with standard models of network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), PA
θ can be viewed as a good which is consumed in variable quantities by heterogeneous
individuals, and where the magnitude of the peer effects depends on the total quantity
consumed across types, rather than on the total number of individuals in the economy.
In addition, the value each individual receives on account of peer effects depends on
the individual’s consumption, as well as on the individual’s type. In other words, we
have type-dependent peer effects.
Following Alesina et al (2005) we use a specification of Ui where U(ci) = ci is linear
and H(θi, θ̂) = 2θi− θ2i + εθiθ̂ is quadratic.6 As ci = 1− θi, individuals’ utility function
is thus given by:
Ui = 1− θi + αi
[
2θi − θ2i + εθiθ̂
]
(1)
where the parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] measures the social multiplier.7
First we focus on the Laissez Faire (LF) equilibrium. Then, a type i individual
chooses the level of PA θLFi that maximizes Ui, as defined by (1). Individuals take as
given the average amount of PA within the community θ̂. Indeed, we assume that the
individual’s weight in the community is too small and thus they do not account for
the effect of their individual choices on θ̂. From the individual problems we obtain the
6H(.) is the V (.) of Alesina et al (2005, Section 5) when ν0 = 2, ν1 = 1 and ν2 = ε.
7Even though we focus on the social multiplier effects associated with PA practice the present setup
is sufficiently general to be used in the analyzes of other goods and services where social multiplier
effects occur, such as education or the use of new technologies.
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following FOCs:
θLFA = 1−
1
2αA
+
εθ̂
2
(2A)
and:
θLFB = 1−
1
2αB
+
εθ̂
2
(2B)
Irrespective of the individual’s type, θLFi is increasing in the average community
PA θ̂. The (interior) equilibrium of the LF economy consists of a pair (θLFA , θLFB ) ∈
(0, 1) × (0, 1) which solves (2A), (2B) and θ̂ = pθLFA + (1 − p)θLFB . We can establish
that:
Proposition 1.
The LF–equilibrium (θLFA , θLFB ) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) is given by:
θLFA =
2αB(2αA − 1)− ε(1− p)(αA − αB)
2(2− ε)αAαB
and:
θLFB =
2αA(2αB − 1) + εp(αA − αB)
2(2− ε)αAαB
The optimal value θLFA is larger than θLFB and the two values are both increasing and
convex functions of ε with the same slopes.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Proposition 1 characterizes the LF–equilibrium in which those the most concerned
with PA end up consuming more of it. Additionally, the higher the social multiplier
the higher the equilibrium levels of PA.
We now focus on the Government (G) equilibrium by considering a utilitarian gov-
ernment, which maximizes a weighted sum of individuals’ utilityW = pUA+(1−p)UB,
where Ui is given by (1).
While the government knows the distribution of types in the community and rec-
ognizes that individuals have different preferences regarding PA, we suppose, in this
section, that these are not observable and that it is too costly for the government to
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impose different levels of PA. Therefore, it chooses and enforces a uniform level θG,
irrespectively of individuals’ concerns regarding PA.
We acknowledge that we abstract from the discussion about the government ca-
pability of enforcing PA recommendations and assume they are indeed enforced. In
practice we tend to believe that policies relying on incentives may be more effective
than enforcement policies which are much more costly to implement. Before returning
to this discussion in the conclusion, we note that it is indeed possible for the govern-
ment to impose PA. An example is the common practice of compulsory PA classes in
schools, according to the age of the students. Compulsory PA could indeed also be a
common practice in elderly care facilities, being enough to restrict licenses to the in-
stitutions fulfilling PA requirements. Yet for the time being note that PA enforcement
for the overweight is being currently discussed in England, and Japan has enforced
health treatments which include PA for those 40 years old and older who are over the
maximum waist circumference authorized by the Metabo law.8
In contrast to individual behavior, the government internalizes the effect of indi-
vidual PA levels on the community average level θ̂ and, θ̂ = θG. Thus, the government
chooses the uniform level of PA θG that maximizes the following welfare function:
W = 1− θ + Λ[2θ − (1− ε)θ2]
where Λ = pαA + (1− p)αB and the FOC being:
1− ε˜G = (1− ε)θG (3)
where, according to Assumption 1, ε˜G = 1/(2Λ) < 1. We can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.
The G–equilibrium θG ∈ (0, 1] is given by:
8See for England http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9777453/Obese-people-may-be-
forced-to-exercise-or-lose-benefits.html, and for Japan http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/world/asi
a/13fat.html both accessed on February 20, 2013.
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θG=

1− ε˜G
1− ε if ε < ε˜G
1 if ε ≥ ε˜G
The optimal value θG is an increasing and convex function of ε for ε < ε˜G. This
function is more convex than θLFA and θLFB . Additionally, θG is larger than θLFB . More-
over, there exists a unique εG ∈ (0, ε˜G) such that θG is larger (resp: lower) than θLFA if
and only if ε is larger (resp: lower) than εG.
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
Results of Proposition 1 and 2 can be summarized by Figure 1, which plots the
functions θG, θLFA , and θLFB . These are increasing and convex in the social multiplier ε.
1
ε˜G0
θLFB θG θ
LF
A
εG
ε
Figure 1: LF–equilibrium versus G–equilibrium
When the social multiplier is high enough (ε > εG) the PA level imposed by the
government is above both individual types’ equilibrium levels. Yet, when the social
multiplier is not as strong, it is optimal for the government to impose a θG above type
B individuals’ PA but below type A individuals’ PA.
Since neither type of individuals internalize the effects of the social multiplier, their
choices have the same slope. On the contrary, the government internalizes the social
multiplier effect, and therefore the stronger this effect the more the government is
willing to increase PA practice. Consequently, θG is more convex than θLFA and θLFB .
Finally, we focus on individuals’ welfare. According to Appendix C, the welfare
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of type i individuals at the LF–equilibrium, denoted ULFi , and at the G–equilibrium,
denoted UGi , are:
ULFi = 1 + αi(θLFi )2
UGi = 1 + [(1 + ε˜G)αi − 1]θG
(4)
Then, concerning type A individuals welfare, we can establish that:
Proposition 3.
Both at the LF–equilibrium and at the G–equilibrium, UA is an increasing and
convex function of ε and there exists a unique ε̂A ∈ (0, εG) such that:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ULFA > UGA if 0 ≤ ε < ε̂A
ULFA < UGA if ε̂A < ε ≤ ε˜G
Proof. See Appendix C. 2
Proposition 3 states that whether type A individuals are better off under the uni-
form government recommendation depends on the social multiplier. Its results are
summarized in Figure 2.
2αA
ε˜G0
ULFA UGA
ε̂A εG
ε
Figure 2: Welfare for type A individuals
For low levels of the social multiplier (ε < ε̂A), type A individuals are worse off
under the G–equilibrium than under the LF–equilibrium. In this case, θLFB < θG < θLFA
(Figure 1), but peer effects are not strong enough to multiply the effect of the increase
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of type B individuals’ PA and compensate for the reduction of type A individuals’ PA.
On the contrary, if the social multiplier is high enough (ε > ε̂A), type A individuals
are better off under the government uniform policy θG. Indeed, when ε ∈ (ε̂A, εG), the
reduction of type A individuals’ PA is more than compensated by the increase of type B
individuals’ PA, whereas, when ε > εG, peer effects are so beneficial that, additionally,
it pays to increase type A individuals’ PA with respect to individual choices.
The function UGA is more convex than ULFA because the government takes into ac-
count the externality associated with the social multiplier, the importance of which is
increasing in ε, while individuals do not.
Regarding the welfare of typeB individuals, and using the threshold p̂ = min{1, αB(2αB−
1)/[2(αA − αB)(1− αB)]}, we can establish that:
Proposition 4.
At the LF–equilibrium, ULFB is an increasing and convex function of ε.
At the G–equilibrium, UGB is an increasing and convex function of ε for p ≤ p̂ and
a decreasing and concave function of ε for p > p̂.
Moreover, there exists a unique p ≤ p̂ such that:
• if p > p, then ULFB > UGB for all 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε˜G
• if p ≤ p, there exists a unique ε̂B ∈ (0, ε˜G) such that:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ULFB > UGB if 0 ≤ ε < ε̂B
ULFB ≤ UGB if ε̂B ≤ ε ≤ ε˜G
Proof. See Appendix D. 2
Proposition 4 states that the government does better for type B individuals than the
Laissez Faire if (i) there are many type B individuals to care about (p ≤ p), so that the
government weights enough their welfare and chooses a level of PA in accordance with
their weaker preference for it; and (ii) if peer effects are strong enough (ε̂B ≤ ε ≤ ε˜G).
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On the contrary, the government always does better for type A individuals as long as
peer effects are strong enough (Proposition 3).
In order to understand the results of Propositions 3 and 4, it is necessary to under-
stand why UGB increases in ε for sufficiently low values of p and decreases for sufficiently
large values of p, whereas UGA increases in ε whatever p. Several direct and indirect
effects are at play. First it helps to note that UGi is a function of θGε,p, given ε and p.
In fact, at θˆ = θGε,p, (1) is simplified to:
UGi (ε, θGε,p) = 1 + [2αi − 1]θGε,p − αi(1− ε)[θGε,p]2 (5)
It is clear that the function UGi (.) is concave in θG, increasing towards the maximum
and afterwards decreasing, for both types (i = A,B). Its maximum value is attained
at:
θ?i =
2αi − 1
2αi(1− ε)
This maximum corresponds to the G–equilibrium of Proposition 2 with p = 1 and
p = 0 for respectively type-A and type-B individuals, i.e., θ?A = θGε,1 and θ?B = θGε,0.
⇒ An increase of ε leads to an increase of UG(ε, θG).
UGA
θG0
•
θ?A = θ
G
ε,1
UGA (ε, θGε,p)
UGA (ε′, θGε′,p)
UGB
θG0
•
θ?B = θ
G
ε,0
UGB (ε, θGε,p)
UGB (ε′, θGε′,p)
ε′ > ε
Figure 3: Direct effect
A first direct effect is that UGi (.) is increasing in ε > 0, as it follows from (5).
Graphically, if UGi (.) is plotted against θG, an increase in ε shifts the curve UGi (.)
upwards, as represented in Figure 3.
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Other indirect effects are translated into a movement along the curve UGi (.) as ε,
and p vary. Indeed, θGε,p increases in ε, and p as:
θGε,p =
2αB − 1 + 2p(αA − αB)
2(1− ε)[αB + p(αA − αB)]
Such indirect effects are represented in Figure 4.
⇒ An increase of ε leads to an increase of θGε,p.
θG0 • •
θGε,p θ
G
ε′,p
ε′ > ε
⇒ An increase of p leads to an increase of θGε,p.
θG0 For agents A: •
θ?A = θ
G
ε,1
•
θGε,0
θG0 For agents B: •
θ?B = θ
G
ε,0
•
θGε,1
Figure 4: Indirect effects
If θGε,p < θ?i , an increase in ε leads to a movement along UGi (.) in its increasing interval
and therefore such an indirect effect reinforces the first direct effect. Undoubtedly,
UGi (.) increases. This is the case for typeA individuals, given that θ?A takes its maximum
at p = 1. On the contrary, if θGε,p > θ?i , an increase in ε leads to a movement along
UGi (.) in its decreasing interval, which undermines the direct effect of increasing UGi (.).
This is the case for type B individuals, given that θ?B takes its maximum at p = 0.
Figures 5 and 6 summarize the forces at work.
In Figure 5, UGA is represented as a function of the government policy θG. As already
shown, this function is concave and its maximum value is attained at θGε,1, the level of
PA the government would had chosen if there were no type B individuals. Since θG is
increasing in p, for interior values of p the government optimal choice must be to the
left of θGε,1. Now let us observe the two effects when the social multiplier increases from
ε to ε′. The direct effect shifts UGA up in conformity with UGA (ε′, θGε′,p) > UGA (ε, θGε,p).
The indirect effect also increases UGA since the government choice θG increases in the
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increasing branch of UGA (i.e., θGε,p < θGε′,p < θ?A). Therefore, both effects lead to a
increases of type A individuals’ welfare.
UGA
θG0
•
•
θGε′,1
θGε,1
•
•
θGε′,p
θGε,p
•
•
θGε′,0
θGε,0
UGA (ε, θGε,p)
UGA (ε′, θGε′,p)
Figure 5: Unambiguous impact of ε on type A individuals’ welfare
Now, we consider Figure 6 which plots the analogous function for typeB individuals.
UGB
θG0
•
•
θGε′,0
θGε,0
•
•
θGε′,p
θGε,p
UGB (ε, θGε,p)
UGB (ε′, θGε′,p)
• •θGε,p̂ θ
G
ε′,p̂
• •θGε,p′ θGε′,p′
•
•θGε,1
θGε′,1
Figure 6: Ambiguous impact of ε on type B individuals’ welfare
The maximum value of UGB is attained at θGε,0. Since θG is increasing in p, for
interior values of p the government optimal choice must be to the right of θGε,0. Now
let us observe the two effects when the social multiplier increases from ε to ε′. The
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direct effect shifts UGB up in conformity with UGB (ε′, θGε′,p) > UGB (ε, θGε,p). Importantly,
the indirect effect on UGB is now ambiguous since the government choice θG increases
in the decreasing branch of UGB (i.e., θ?B < θGε,p < θGε′,p). The intensity of such an effect
depends on p. If p is low enough (p < p̂), then θGε,p is sufficiently near θ?B implying that
the indirect effect is weaker than the direct one. Consequently, type B individuals’
welfare ends up increasing. On the contrary, if p is sufficiently high (p′ > p̂), then the
decreasing slope of UGB (.) in θGε,p′ is too important and thus the direct effect is completely
neutralized by the indirect one. Consequently, an increase of ε leads to a decrease of
type B individuals’ welfare.
Results of Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figure 7.
ε
0 1/(2Λ)
 
 
p=0.1 UB
LF
 UB
G
ε
0 1/(2Λ)
 
 
p=0.3 UB
LF
 UB
G
ε
0 1/(2Λ)
 
 
p=0.6 UB
LF
 UB
G
ε
0 1/(2Λ)
 
 
p=0.9 UB
LF
 UB
G
Figure 7: Type B individuals’ welfare according to pA
This figure plots type B individuals’ welfare under the LF–equilibrium (purple line)
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and under the G–equilibrium (orange line) as a function of the social multiplier. In this
example we assume αA = 0.8 and αB = 0.6. The difference among the four figures relies
on the value assumed for p, the proportion of individuals with the highest concern for
PA. We have assumed, from the top-left to the bottom-right, p = 0.1, p = 0.3, p = 0.6,
and p = 0.9.
Two remarks can be made. First, in the four examples, ULFB is increasing in the
social multiplier whereas UGB is decreasing for p = 0.9. This is precisely the result we
discuss above, i.e., when type A individuals are too many the government gives little
weight to type B individuals’ preferences and imposes such a high level of PA that type
B individuals can end up worse off. Second, for sufficiently low levels of p, individuals
are better off under the LF–equilibrium than under the government policy, unless peer
effects become important. An illustration is provided for p = 0.1.
According to Appendix E, the threshold ε̂B increases in p and ε̂B|p=0 = 0 while ε̂A
decreases in p and ε̂A|p=1 = 0. Then, there exists a unique threshold p ∈ (0, p) such
that ε̂A is larger (resp: lower) than ε̂B if and only if p is lower (resp: larger) than p.
Using p and Propositions 3 and 4, we can state Corollary 1.
Corollary 1.
The G–equilibrium constitutes a Pareto improvement if and only if (p < p and
ε > ε̂A) or (p < p < p and ε > ε̂B).
Both individual types are worse off under the G–equilibrium if and only if (p < p
and ε < ε̂B) or (p < p and ε < ε̂A).
Proof. See Appendix E. 2
Corollary 1 states the conditions under which the government should undoubtedly
intervene and the conditions under which there is no role for government intervention
because both types end up worse off. When the proportion of type A individuals is
not too high and peer effects are strong enough, both types of individuals are better
off under the government policy. In this case, for sufficiently few type A individuals,
i.e., p < p, type B individuals are better off under the government policy at lower peer
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effects than are type A individuals (because ε̂B < ε̂A). If, instead, type A individuals
are sufficiently numerous, i.e., p < p < p, it is those individuals who are better off under
the government policy at lower peer effects (because ε̂A < ε̂B). If, on the other hand,
peer effects are too weak then both individuals are worse off under the G–equilibrium
and therefore there is no role for government intervention.
We have shown that the existence of a social multiplier is not a reason per se to
justify government intervention. This result is due to the uniform PA level imposed
on both individual types, which is a common practice of government PA (mass media)
campaigns such as the ones discussed in the introduction. Our contribution aims to
highlight that if the social multiplier associated with PA is low, then the government
may indeed harm all in society by advising a uniform level of PA.
3 The case with public information
In this section we suppose that the government can implement the First Best. Thus, we
assume that individual types are observable and that it is possible to enforce different
PA levels. Such an exercise is only relevant as a benchmark since in the real world
individuals’ types are not observable. Nevertheless, there are situations in which the
government can observe individual types. Returning to the PA campaigns discussed in
the introduction, it is presently common practice to advise children to perform double
the recommended PA for adults. We can interpret observable types as children and
adults, and we abstract from any heterogeneity within the same type.
The First Best (FB) equilibrium consists of the government choices of θFBA and θFBB
that maximize W = pUA + (1− p)UB, with θ̂ = pθFBA + (1− p)θFBB .
Let δ = 4αAαB− (1−p)(αA−αB)(1+2αB) and using the two following thresholds:
εA =
−δ +√δ2 + 8p(1− p)(αA − αB)2αB
2p(1− p)(αA − αB)2 and εB =
1
αB + Λ
we establish that:
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Proposition 5.
The FB–equilibrium (θFBA , θFBB ) ∈ (0, 1]× (0, 1] is given by:
θFBA =

θ˜FBA =
2αB(2αA − 1)− ε(1− p)(αA − αB)(1 + 2αB)
4αAαB − 4αAαBε− p(1− p)(αA − αB)2ε2 if ε < εA
1 if ε ≥ εA
and:
θFBB =

θ˜FBB =
2αA(2αB − 1) + εp(αA − αB)(1 + 2αA)
4αAαB − 4αAαBε− p(1− p)(αA − αB)2ε2 if ε < εA
θ
FB
B =
2αB − 1 + εp(αA + αB)
2αB[1− ε(1− p)] if εA ≤ ε < εB
1 if ε ≥ εB
The optimal values θ˜FBA , θ˜FBB and θ
FB
B are both increasing and convex functions of ε.
Moreover, θFBA is larger than θFBB , θFBA is larger than θLFA , θFBB is larger than θLFB , θG
is lower than θFBA , and θG is larger than θFBB .
Proof. See Appendix F. 2
1
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Figure 8: FB–equilibrium versus LF–equilibrium and G–equilibrium
Figure 8 plots θFBA , θFBB , θLFA , θLFB , and θG. For each type, the FB–equilibrium
PA level is above the respective LF–equilibrium value. The positive externality as-
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sociated with the social multiplier implies that individuals do too little PA in the
LF–equilibrium. Also, θFBA and θFBB are increasing in the social multiplier. Moreover,
as discrimination is feasible, the government chooses to increase (resp: decrease) type
A (resp: type B) individuals’ PA relative to θG, i.e., θFBA > θG > θFBB . In a sense, the
government is better able to take into consideration individual preferences.
Using the fact that εA < ε˜G < εB and substituting in (1) the values θFBA and θFBB as
defined above allow us to obtain:
UFBA =

U˜FBA = 1 +
(
αB(2αA − 1)
αA + αB
)
θ˜FBA +
(
αA(αA − αB)(1− εp)
αA + αB
)
(θ˜FBA )
2 if ε < εA
UFBA = αA[1 + εp+ (1− p)εθ
FB
B ] if εA ≤ ε ≤ ε˜G
and:
UFBB =

U˜FBB = 1 +
(
αA(2αB − 1)
αA + αB
)
θ˜FBB −
(
αB(αA − αB)[1− ε(1− p)]
αA + αB
)
(θ˜FBB )
2 if ε < εA
UFBB = 1 +
(
2αB − 1− εp(αA − αB)
2
)
θB if εA ≤ ε ≤ ε˜G
We can thus establish:
Proposition 6.
The optimal values U˜FBA and U
FB
A are increasing and convex functions of ε. The
optimal value U˜FBB is an increasing function for sufficiently low values of ε, whereas
UFBB is an increasing function for sufficiently low values of p but a decreasing one for
sufficiently high values of p.
Moreover, when ε is sufficiently low, then UFBA is larger than UGA whereas UFBA is
lower than UGA for sufficiently large values of ε. Also, when ε is sufficiently low or
sufficiently large, then UFBB is larger than UGB .
Proof. See Appendix G. 2
We comment on Proposition 6 above with the help of a numerical illustration where
we suppose αA = 0.9, αB = 0.6, and p = 0.7.
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Figure 9: FB–equilibrium versus LF–equilibrium and G–equilibrium
In Figure 9 we plot the PA choices θLFA , θLFB , θFBA , θFBB , and θG. It can be verified
that we recover the proprieties established in Proposition 5 and Figure 8.
Figures 10 and 11 represent, respectively, type A and B individuals’ welfare un-
der the three scenarios LF–equilibrium, G–equilibrium, and FB–equilibrium. In these
figures, the graphs on the left represent the welfare up to the threshold εA. At the
beginning the difference between the curves is not clear, and we therefore present on
the right the same curves zoomed for the lowest values of ε.
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Figure 10: Type A individuals’ welfare
In fact, the welfare of First Best is always larger (resp: lower) than the welfare of
Laissez Faire for individuals of type A (resp: type B). We can also highlight that,
first, for very low levels of the social multiplier, both types are worse off under the G–
20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.97
1
1.07
 ε
 
 
 UB
FB
 UB
LF
 UB
G
0 0.1 0.2
1.017
1.021
1.025
 ε
 
 
 UB
FB
 UB
LF
Figure 11: Type B individuals’ welfare
equilibrium than under the LF–equilibrium, in accordance with Corollary 1. Second,
type A individuals benefit from any government intervention and mainly from the
G–equilibrium approach for high levels of the social multiplier, in accordance with
Proposition 6. In fact, they benefit from the general increase in PA imposed on society
without compromising a decrease in the consumption of other goods. This effect is
stronger under the G–equilibrium where a higher level of PA is imposed to type B
individuals. Third, for type A individuals, the benefit associated with the government
policies is most important for high levels of the social multiplier. Finally, the increase in
type A individuals’ welfare is made at the cost of imposing a high level of PA to type B
individuals. Indeed type B individuals are worse off under any of the two government
policies than under the LF–equilibrium. Interestingly, their welfare – not only at the
G–equilibrium but also at the FB–equilibrium – is decreasing even for higher levels
of the social multiplier. In fact, a high social multiplier makes the government more
willing to impose a higher level of PA because the positive externality effects become
more important. Yet, this is done at the cost of a decrease of type B individuals’
welfare.
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4 Conclusion
We analyze the effects of PA encouragement policies when individuals differ with re-
spect to their concern for PA and in the presence of a social multiplier effect in PA
practice. If the social multiplier is strong enough, we find that uniform and First Best
policies increase the welfare of the individuals the most concerned with PA, at the
cost of a decrease in the welfare of those the least concerned when they are not too
many. But, compared to the First Best, a uniform recommendation improves the wel-
fare of those most concerned with PA more than it reduces the welfare of those least
concerned. Moreover, the welfare of those the least concerned with PA may even be
decreasing in the strength of the social multiplier, both under a uniform policy and
under the First Best policy. Indeed, the social multiplier may be so strong that it
may be welfare improving to increase the PA level to a degree that it harms the least
concerned individuals but greatly benefits the most concerned individuals.
This paper can be extended in several directions. First, we focus on an aggregate
externality, i.e., the social multiplier effect, and therefore individuals take as given the
aggregate average of PA. Alternatively, we could assume that individuals perceive the
impact of their choices on others’ decisions with obvious consequences for public inter-
vention. We believe it is worth developing a network setup in which individuals have
social interactions with some individuals but not with others to encompass the latter
possibility. Second, we analyze only one of many possible government interventions
aiming at an increase in PA. Many others include provision of sporting infrastructures,
revision of urban planning to ensure that walking, cycling, and other forms of active
lifestyles are accessible and safe, or to encourage PA networks, among others. Addition-
ally, PA could be seen as voluntary contributions towards a public good, say general
health in the population or PA infrastructures. Finally, along our analyses we have
considered that PA levels are enforced and verifiable but have neglected the discussion
about its implementation. While the First Best policy could be decentralized by means
of taxes/subsidies on PA, this is not necessarily the case for the uniform policy. A com-
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plement to our analyses could consider an incentive compatible problem assuming the
concern for PA is not observable. In such a case, the government could implement a
second best approach by offering a menu of contracts among which individuals would
self-select. Alternatively, the government could make use of other individual character-
istics correlated with PA concern as, for example, age. In this regard “tagging” could
be used (see for example, Cremer et al., 2010, for a recent contribution, and for a
survey). Finally, a potentially relevant alternative assumption is to consider that even
the individuals themselves are not fully aware of the benefits of PA for their health.
Bringing uncertainty to the present setup opens the door to explore the benefits of
information disclosure mechanisms for health (and welfare) improvement (see, among
others, Bardey and De Donder, 2012, for the use of genetic testing and its implications
on prevention behaviors).
More specifically, recent studies have explored barriers to PA in LTC settings (see
the survey of Benjamin et al, 2013), which can occur at the individual, organizational,
and environmental levels. Reported barriers include seniors’ poor health, fear of falling,
and a past history of sedentary lifestyles; organizational challenges such as inadequate
staffing levels and institutional care routines; and environmental realities such as lack
of designated spaces and equipment for PA. Future studies targeting PA interventions
for residents living in LTC are needed to address these multiple levels of influence.
Importantly, our study shows how uniform policies may differently affect heterogenous
populations, and how important it is to carefully implement adequate levels of PA
for each target population. In particular, we find our results useful in considering PA
policies targeting the elderly, which have, in our view, important consequences for the
provision of LTC.
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Appendix
Appendix A – Proof of Proposition 1.
An LF–equilibrium consists of a pair (θLFA , θLFB ) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) which solves equa-
tions (2A), (2B) and θ̂ = pθLFA + (1− p)θLFB . Solving this system leads to:
θLFA =
4αAαB − 2αB − ε(1− p)(αA − αB)
2(2− ε)αAαB and θ
LF
B =
4αAαB − 2αA + εp(αA − αB)
2(2− ε)αAαB
Note that θLFA − θLFB = (αA−αB)/(2αAαB). Therefore, according to Assumption 1
θLFA > θ
LF
B , for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, to establish that (θLFA , θLFB ) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)
it is sufficient to show that θLFB > 0 and θLFA < 1. The positivity of θLFB is obvious.
Having θLFA < 1 is equivalent to 2αB(εαA − 1) − ε(1 − p)(αA − αB) < 0. Therefore,
according to Assumption 1, (θLFA , θLFB ) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) is the LF–equilibrium.
After computations, we obtain ∂εθLFA = ∂εθLFB = [2αAαB − (1− p)αA − pαB]/[(2−
ε)2αAαB]. As αB < αA and 2αB > 1, (1 − p)αA + pαB < 2αAαB and, consequently,
θLFA and θLFB increase in ε. We also have ∂εεθLFA = ∂εεθLFB = 2[2αAαB − (1 − p)αA −
pαB]/[(2− ε)3αAαB]. Then, θLFA and θLFB are convex functions of ε. 2
Appendix B – Proof of Proposition 2.
According to (3) we have θG = (1 − ε˜G)/(1 − ε). This value is lower than 1 since,
according to Assumption 1, ε˜G = 1/(2Λ) < 1. Therefore, θG = (1− ε˜G)/(1− ε) when
ε ≤ ε˜G, and θG = 1 otherwise.
After computations, ∂εθG = [2Λ− 1]/[2Λ(1− ε)2] and ∂εεθG = [2Λ− 1]/[Λ(1− ε)3].
As 2Λ > 1, ∂εθG and ∂εεθG are positive and θG is increasing and convex in ε.
Additionally, ∂εεθG − ∂εεθLFi has the sign of αAαB[(2 − ε)3 − 2(1 − ε)3][2Λ − 1] +
2p(1 − p)(αA − αB)2(1 − ε)3. Since for all ε ∈ [0, 1] we have (2 − ε)3 > 2(1 − ε)3 and
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2Λ > 1, ∂εεθG − ∂εεθLFi is positive and, consequently, θG is more convex than θLFA and
θLFB .
Finally note that θLFA |ε=0 = 1 − 1/(2αA) > θG|ε=0 = 1 − 1/(2Λ) > θLFB |ε=0 =
1 − 1/(2αB) and, according to Proposition 1, θG|ε=ε˜G = 1 > θLFA |ε=ε˜G > θLFB |ε=ε˜G .
Therefore, since ∂εεθLFi < ∂εεθG, θLFB < θG for all ε ∈ [0, ε˜G] and there exists a unique
εG ∈ (0, ε˜G) such that θLFA ≶ θG if and only if ε ≷ εG. 2
Appendix C – Proof of Proposition 3.
According to (2i) (i = A or B) we have αiεθ̂LF = 2αiθLFi − 2αi + 1. Substituting
this into (1) allows us to obtain ULFi = 1 + αi(θLFi )2. Consequently, we have ∂εULFi =
2αiθ
LF
i ∂εθ
LF
i and ∂εεULFi = 2αi[(∂εθLFi )2 + θLFi ∂εεθLFi ]. Both expressions are positive
since ∂εθLFi and ∂εεθLFi are positive. Therefore, ULFA and ULFB are increasing and convex
functions of ε.
Substituting (3) into (1) allows us to obtain UGi = 1 + [(1 + ε˜G)αi− 1]θG. Then, we
have ∂εUGi = [(1 + ε˜G)αi − 1]∂εθG and ∂εεUGi = [(1 + ε˜G)αi − 1]∂εεθG. Since ∂εθG and
∂εεθ
G are positive, ∂εUGi and ∂εεUGi have the sign of (1 + ε˜G)αi − 1. As ε˜G > 1/(2αA)
and αA > 1/2 we have (1 + ε˜G)αA > 1. Consequently, UGA is an increasing and convex
function of ε ∈ [0, ε˜G).
We now contrast ULFA with UGA . Using Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain ∂εUGA =
A/[4Λ2(1−ε)2] and ∂εULFA = B/[αAα2B(2−ε)3] withA = 2Λ−αA−4Λ2(1−αA) and B =
[2αB+ε(1−p)(αA−αB)][pαB+(1−p)αA]−2αAαB[4αB+(1−p)(αA−αB)(2+ε)]+8α2Aα2B.
Then ∂εUGA −∂εULFA has the sign of (2− ε)3C −8(1− ε)2D with C = αAα2BA(Λ) and
D = Λ2B/2. Using the facts that C > 0 and (2−ε)3 ≥ 8(1−ε)2, a sufficient condition to
show the positivity of ∂εUGA −∂εULFA is to establish the positivity of C−D. Rearranging
terms leads to C−D = (2Λ−αA)αAα2B+Λ2{αB[(1−p)(αA−αB)(2αA−1)−αB]+εE} with
2E = (αA−αB)(1−p)[αB(2αA−1)−(1−p)(αA−αB)] > (αA−αB)(1−p)[αA(2αB−1)] >
0. Let σ = (1−p)(αA−αB). Since E > 0 and Λ = αA−σ, we have C−D ≥ (C−D)|ε=0 =
αB(2αA−1)σF(σ) with F(σ) = σ2− [2αA+αB/(2αA−1)]σ+α2A. As 0 ≤ σ ≤ αA−αB,
F ′(σ) < 0 and, therefore, F(σ) ≥ F(αA − αB) = αAαB(2αB − 1)/(2αA − 1) ≥ 0.
Consequently, C − D > 0 meaning that UGA − ULFA increases in ε for ε ∈ [0, ε˜G).
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From (1) we obtain (UGA −ULFA )|ε=0 = [θLFA |ε=0 − θG|ε=0][1 + αA(θLFA |ε=0 + θG|ε=0 −
2)]. As θLFA |ε=0 = 1 − 1/(2αA) > θG|ε=0 = 1 − ε˜G, we have θLFA |ε=0 + θG|ε=0 <
2 − 1/αA. Hence, we obtain (UGA − ULFA )|ε=0 < 0. Given the definition of εG (see
Proposition 2), θLFA |ε=εG = θG|ε=εG ≡ θ
LF . From (1) it follows that (UGA −ULFA )|ε=εG =
αAεGθ
LF
(θ
LF − θ̂LF |ε=εG) = αAεGθ
LF
(1 − p)(θLF − θLFB |ε=εG). Since, according to
Proposition 1, θLFB |ε=εG < θLFA |ε=εG = θ
LF , then (UGA − ULFA )|ε=εG > 0. Consequently,
since UGA − ULFA increases in ε for ε ∈ [0, ε˜G), there exists a unique ε̂A ∈ (0, εG) such
that ULFA > UGA if 0 ≤ ε < ε̂A and ULFA < UGA if ε̂A < ε ≤ ε˜G. 2
Appendix D – Proof of Proposition 4.
In Appendix C we establish that ULFB is an increasing and convex function of ε and
that ∂εUGB and ∂εεUGB have the sign of (1 + ε˜G)αB− 1, i.e., after computations, the sign
of αB−2Λ(1−αB) = αB(2αB−1)−2p(αA−αB)(1−αB). Then ∂εUGB and ∂εεUGB have
the sign of p̂− p with p̂ = min{1, αB(2αB − 1)/[2(αA − αB)(1− αB)]}. Consequently,
UGB is a decreasing and concave function of ε if p > p̂ and an increasing and convex
function of ε if p ≤ p̂.
According to (1), (UGB −ULFB )|ε=0 = [θLFB |ε=0−θG|ε=0][1+αB(θLFB |ε=0 +θG|ε=0−2)].
As θLFB |ε=0 = 1 − 1/(2αB) < θG|ε=0 = 1 − ε˜G, we have θLFB |ε=0 + θG|ε=0 > 2 − 1/αB.
Hence, we obtain:
⇒ Fact 1 – For all p ∈ (0, 1), ULFB > UGB when ε = 0.
When p > p̂, ULFB increases in ε for ε ∈ [0, ε˜G] while UGB decreases and, according
to Fact 1, we have ULFB > UGB when 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε˜G. When p ≤ p̂, complications arise
since both ULFB and UGB increase in ε. According to Appendix C, ∂εULFB − ∂εUGB =
2αBθ
LF
B ∂εθ
LF
B − [(1 + ε˜G)αB − 1]∂εθGB . Then, after computations and using Appendix
A and B, ∂εULFB − ∂εUGB has the sign of P(ε) = 4Λ2(1 − ε)2[4αAαB − 2αA + εp(αA −
αB)][2αAαB−pαB− (1−p)αA]− (2−ε)3α2AαB[(1+2Λ)αB−2Λ][2Λ−1]. The degree of
this polynomial function is three and P(ε) = 8Λ2αA[2αB−1][2αAαB−pαB−(1−p)αA]−
8α2AαB[(1 + 2Λ)αB − 2Λ][2Λ− 1] = 8αA
{
Λ2p[2αB − 1][αA − αB] + αA[Λ− αB]2
}
> 0.
Moreover, P(1) = −α2AαB[(1 + 2Λ)αB − 2Λ][2Λ− 1] and P ′(1) = 3α2AαB[(1 + 2Λ)αB −
30
2Λ][2Λ− 1]. As p ≤ p̂, (1 + 2Λ)αB− 2Λ > 0 and consequently P(1) < 0 and P ′(1) > 0.
The fact that P(0) > 0, P(1) < 0 and P ′(1) > 0 implies the existence and the
uniqueness of root εs between 0 and 1.9 Then, P(ε) > 0 if 0 ≤ ε < εs and P(ε) < 0 if
εs < ε < 1. Consequently, we establish:
⇒ Fact 2 – When εs ≥ ε˜G, UGB − ULFB decreases in ε for ε ∈ [0, ε˜G). When
εs < ε˜G, the function UGB − ULFB decreases for ε ∈ [0, εs) and increases for
ε ∈ (εs, ε˜G).
Note that ∂p[(1 + ε˜G)αB − 1] = −αB(αA − αB)/(2Λ2), ∂pθLFB = ε(αA − αB)/[2(2−
ε)αAαB] and ∂pθG = (αA−αB)/[2Λ2(1−ε)]. Then η1 = [(1+ε˜G)αB−1]∂pθG+θG∂p[(1+
ε˜G)αB − 1] = −[p(αA − αB)2]/[2(1− ε)Λ3] < 0. As UGB − ULFB = [(1 + ε˜G)αB − 1]θG −
αB(θ
LF
B )
2, we have ∂pUGB − ∂pULFB = η1 − 2αBθLFB ∂pθLFB < 0. Then, we establish:
⇒ Fact 3 – The function UGB − ULFB is a decreasing function of p.
Given ε, the maximum of UGB −ULFB is obtained when p = 0, i.e., (UGB −ULFB )|p=0 =
ε2(2αB − 1)2/[4αB(1− ε)(2− ε)2]. Hence:
⇒ Fact 4 – For all ε > 0, UGB − ULFB > 0 if p = 0.
Using Fact 1 to Fact 4, it is straightforward to establish the assertion of our propo-
sition using the (possible) existence of two thresholds p and pˇ (0 < p ≤ pˇ ≤ p̂) such
that:
F If 0 < p < pˇ, there exists a threshold εs < ε˜G, such that UGB − ULFB decreases in
ε for ε ∈ [0, εs), increases in ε for ε ∈ (εs, ε˜G) and:
• If 0 < p < p, there exists a unique ε̂B ∈ (εs, ε˜G) such that ULFB > UGB when
0 ≤ ε < ε̂B and ULFB < UGB when ε̂B < ε < ε˜G.
• If p < p < pˇ, ULFB > UGB for all ε.
F If pˇ < p < p̂, UGB − ULFB decreases in ε and ULFB > UG.
9Obviously, P(0) > 0 and P(1) < 0 guarantee the existence of a root εs between 0 and 1. If εs
is not the unique root between 0 and 1, there generally exists three roots ε1, ε2 and ε3 such that
0 < ε1 < ε2 < ε3 < 1 and P ′(ε1) < 0, P ′(ε2) > 0, P ′(ε3) < 0. Then, as P ′(1) > 0, P ′(ε) have at least
three roots: however this is impossible since P ′(ε) is a polynomial function of degree 2. Consequently
εs is unique.
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The threshold p is defined, according to Fact 1 to Fact 4, from the value of p such
that (UGB − ULFB )|ε=ε˜G = 0. This value is given by αB(θLFB )2|ε=ε˜G = (1 + ε˜G)αB − 1
with αB(θLFB )2|ε=ε˜G = [(8αAαB − 4αA + 1)2(αA − αB)2p2 + 8αAαB(2αB − 1)(8αAαB −
4αA + 1)(αA − αB)p + 16α2Aα2B(2αB − 1)2]/[64α2AαB(αA − αB)2p2 + 32α2AαB(4αB −
1)(αA − αB)p + 4α2AαB(4αB − 1)2] and (1 + ε˜G)αB − 1 = [−2(1 − αB)(αA − αB)p +
αB(2αB − 1)]/[2αB + 2(αA− αB)p]. Then, after computations, p is the root of Q(p) =
B1p
3 + B2p
2 + B3p + B4 with B1 = {8αA[2(αA + αB) − 1] + 1}(αA − αB)3, B2 =
αB[16αA(αA+2αB−1)+1](αA+αB)2, B3 = 4αAαB[2αB(2αB−1)+αA(1−αB)](αA−αB)
and B4 = −2α2Aα2B(2αB − 1). Since B1 > 0, B2 > 0, B3 > 0 and B4 < 0, we have
Q′(p) > 0, Q(0) < 0 and limp→+∞Q(p) = +∞. Then, Q(p) has a unique root and
this latter is positive. Consequently, if Q(1) > 0 then this root corresponds to p and if
Q(1) < 0 then p = 1.
By construction, the threshold pˇ exists only when p < 1 and it corresponds to the
unique value pˇ ∈ (0, 1) such that P(1/[2αB + 2pˇ(αA − αB)]) = 0 with P(.) which has
been defined to prove Fact 2. 2
Appendix E – Proof of Corollary 1.
According to Appendix D, ε̂B > εs and, consequently, ε̂B is on the branch of the
function UGB − ULFB which increases in ε. Then, as UGB − ULFB decreases in p (Fact 3
of Appendix D), the threshold ε̂B increases in p. Moreover, it is straightforward to
establish that ε̂B|p=0 = 0.
Remark that ∂p[(1+ε˜G)αA−1] = −[αA(αA−αB)]/[2Λ2], ∂pθLFA = ε(αA−αB)/[2(2−
ε)αAαB], ∂pθG = (αA−αB)/[2Λ2(1−ε)] and η2 = [(1+ε˜G)αA−1]∂pθG+θG∂p[(1+ε˜G)αA−
1] = [(1−p)(αA−αB)2]/[2(1−ε)Λ3] > 0. As UGA−ULFA = [(1+ ε˜G)αA−1]θG−αA(θLFA )2,
we have ∂pUGA −∂pULFA = η2−2αAθLFA ∂pθLFA = (αA−αB){(1−p)(αA−αB)/[(1−ε)[αB+
p(αA − αB)]3] − ε[2αB(2αA − 1) − ε(1 − p)(αA − αB)]/[αAα2B(2 − ε)2]}/2. Then, it is
straightforward to show that ∂pUGA −∂pULFA is a decreasing function of p. Consequently,
as (∂pUGA − ∂pULFA )|p=1 = −[ε(αA − αB)(2αA − 1)]/[αAαB(2 − ε)2], for all ε > 0 there
exists a threshold p˜ ∈ [0, 1) such that UGA − ULFA decreases in p if (and only if) p > p˜.
Then, because (UGA − ULFA )|p=1 = [(2αA − 1)2ε2]/[4αA(1 − ε)(2 − ε)2] > 0 there exists
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a unique p such that UGA = ULFA , for a given ε > 0. Consequently, ε̂A is a monotonic
function of p. As ε̂A|p=1 = 0, the threshold ε̂A decreases in p.
To summarize, the threshold ε̂B increases in p and ε̂B|p=0 = 0 while ε̂A decreases
in p and ε̂A|p=1 = 0. Then, there exists a unique threshold p ∈ (0, p) such that ε̂A is
larger (resp: lower) than ε̂B if and only if p is lower (resp: larger) than p. Using p and
Propositions 3 and 4, the assertion of Corollary 1 is straightforward. 2
Appendix F – Proof of Proposition 5.
To determine the FB–equilibrium, the government chooses θFBA and θFBB so that
pUA + (1− p)UB is maximum given θ̂ = pθFBA + (1− p)θFBB . We first analyze the case of
interior solutions (Step 1) and then consider the possibility of corner solutions (Step
2).
⇒ Step 1 – The case of interior solutions θFBA ∈ (0, 1) and θFBB ∈ (0, 1).
When FB–equilibrium has interior solutions (θ˜A, θ˜B) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1), the govern-
ment solves:
max
θ˜A,θ˜B
p(1− θ˜A) + αAp[2θ˜A − (θ˜A)2] + (1− p)(1− θ˜B) + αB(1− p)[2θ˜B − (θ˜B)2]
+ε[αAp
2(θ˜A)
2 + αB(1− p)2(θ˜B)2 + (αA + αB)p(1− p)θ˜Aθ˜B]
After simplifications, the two FOC are given by:
2αA − 1− 2αA(1− pε)θ˜A + ε(αA + αB)(1− p)θ˜B = 0 (6)
2αB − 1− 2αB[1− (1− p)ε]θ˜B + ε(αA + αB)pθ˜A = 0 (7)
Rearranging terms we obtain:
θ˜FBA =
uFBA
V
≡ 2αB(2αA − 1)− ε(1− p)(αA − αB)(1 + 2αB)
4αAαB − 4αAαBε− p(1− p)(αA − αB)2ε2
and
θ˜FBB =
uFBB
V
≡ 2αA(2αB − 1) + εp(αA − αB)(1 + 2αA)
4αAαB − 4αAαBε− p(1− p)(αA − αB)2ε2
The value V decreases (and is concave) when ε varies from 0 to 1. As V |ε=0 < 0
and V |ε=1 > 0, there exists a unique εV ∈ (0, 1) such that V is positive if and only if
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ε ∈ [0, εV ). As ε ∈ [0, 1], we have uFBA ≥ (2αB−1)(αA +αB). Thus, uFBA is positive and
decreases in ε. As V |ε=0 > uFBA |ε=0 > 0, there exists a unique εA ∈ (0, εV ) such that
θ˜FBA ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ε ∈ [0, εA). Let δ = 4αAαB− (1−p)(αA−αB)(1+2αB), then
it is straightforward that εA = [−δ +
√
δ2 + 8p(1− p)(αA − αB)2αB]/[2p(1− p)(αA −
αB)
2].
Similarly, it is obvious that uFBB is positive and increases in ε. As V |ε=0 > uFBB |ε=0 >
0, there exists a unique ε˜B ∈ (0, εV ) such that θ˜FBB ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ε ∈ [0, ε˜B).
After computations, ∂εθ˜FBA = NA/V 2 with NA = p(1 − p)(αA − αB)2ε[2αB(2αA −
1) + uFBA ] + 4αAαBu
FB
A |ε=1. As uFBA > 0 and uFBA |ε=1 ≥ (2αB − 1)(αA + αB) > 0, θ˜FBA
increases in ε.
Moreover, we have ∂εεθ˜FBA = ξA/V 3 with ξA = 2p(1−p)uFBA (αA−αB)2V+2NA[4αAαB+
2p(1−p)(αA−αB)2]. As uFBA and NA are positive, ξA is positive and θ˜FBA is an increasing
and convex function of ε when ε ∈ [0, εA). Note that θ˜FBA |ε=0 = (2αA − 1)/(2αA) =
θ˜LFA |ε=0 and θ˜FBA |ε=εA = 1.
We follow by contrasting (θ˜FBA , θ˜FBB ) with (θLFA , θLFB ) and θG. Note that θ˜FBA − θLFA
has the sign of 4αAαBuFBA (1 − ε/2) − [2αB(2αA − 1) − ε(1 − p)(αA − αB)]V , i.e., the
sign of 2αAαBε[2αB(2αA − 1)− (1− p)(αA − αB){ε+ 2αB(2− ε)}] + ε2p(1− p)(αA −
αB)
2[2αB(2αA − 1) − ε(1 − p)(αA − αB)]. As 2αB(2αA − 1) − (1 − p)(αA − αB)[ε +
2αB(2− ε)] ≥ (2αB − 1)[2αB + ε(αA − αB)] > 0, θ˜FBA − θLFA is positive, i.e., θ˜FBA ≥ θLFA .
Moreover, θ˜FBA −θG has the sign of [2αB(2αA−1)−ε(1−p)(αA−αB)(1+2αB)]2(1−
ε)Λ − (2Λ − 1)[4αAαB − 4αAαBε − p(1 − p)(αA − αB)2ε2], i.e., the sign of PA(ε) =
(1−p)(αA−αB)[2Λ(1+2αB)+(2Λ−1)p(αA−αB)]ε2− [4αB(αA−Λ)+2Λ(1−p)(αA−
αB)(1+2αB)]ε+4αB(αA−Λ). As αA−Λ = (1−p)(αA−αB) and p(αA−αB) = Λ−αB
we obtain after computations PA(ε) = (1 − p)(αA − αB)QA(ε) with QA(ε) = [2Λ2 +
(1 + 2αB)Λ + αB]ε
2 − [2(1 + 2αB)Λ + 4αB]ε+ 4αB. Then, the discriminant ∆A of the
polynomial function QA(ε) is such that ∆A = 4Λ2(2αB−1)2. Consequently, the lowest
root of PA(ε) is εˇA = [2(αB + Λ)]/[2Λ2 + (1 + 2αB)Λ +αB]. As PA(0) > 0 and εˇA > 1,
we have PA(ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ [0, 1] and, consequently, θ˜FBA > θG.
Note that ∂εθ˜FBB = NB/V 2 > 0 with NB = p2(1−p)(αA−αB)3(1+2αA)ε2+4αAp(1−
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p)(αA−αB)2(2αB−1)ε+4αAαBuFBB |ε=1. Therefore θ˜FBB increases in ε. Moreover, as NB
and ∂εNB are positive, and ∂εV is negative, θ˜FBB is a convex function of ε if ε ∈ [0, ε˜B).
Remark that θ˜FBB |ε=0 = (2αB−1)/(2αB) = θLFB |ε=0 and θ˜FBB |ε=ε˜B = 1. As the numerator
of θ˜FBB is larger than the one of θLFB whereas the denominator of θ˜FBB is lower than the
one of θLFB , we have θ˜FBB ≥ θLFB .
Finally, θG− θ˜FBB has the sign of (2Λ−1)[4αAαB−4αAαBε−p(1−p)(αA−αB)2ε2]−
2Λ(1 − ε)[2αA(2αB − 1) + εp(αA − αB)(1 + 2αA)], i.e., the sign of PB(ε) = p(αA −
αB)[2Λ{1 + 2αA− (1− p)(αA−αB)}+ (1− p)(αA−αB)]ε2− [4αA(Λ−αB) + 2pΛ(αA−
αB)(1+2αA)]ε+4αA(Λ−αB). As Λ−αB = p(αA−αB) and (1−p)(αA−αB) = αA−Λ
we obtain after computations PB(ε) = p(αA − αB)QB(ε) with QB(ε) = [2Λ2 + (1 +
2αA)Λ + αA]ε
2 − [2(1 + 2αA)Λ + 4αA]ε + 4αA. Then, the discriminant ∆B of the
polynomial function QB(ε) is such that ∆B = 4Λ2(2αA−1)2. Consequently, the lowest
root of PB(ε) is εˇB = [2(αA + Λ)]/[2Λ2 + (1 + 2αA)Λ +αA]. As PB(0) > 0 and εˇB > 1,
we have PB(ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ [0, 1] and, consequently, θG > θ˜FBB .
As regards the comparison between θ˜FBA and θ˜FBB , when ε < εV , θ˜FBA − θ˜FBB has the
sign of uFBA − uFBB , i.e. the sign of 2 − ε(1 + 2Λ). Then, θ˜FBA − θ˜FBB decreases in ε.
Consequently, θ˜FBA > θ˜FBB if and only if ε < ε̂ = 2/(1 + 2Λ). After computations:
(uFBB −V )|ε=ε̂ =
2αA(4α
2
B − 1) + 4p(αA − αB)2 + 2p(αA − αB)[2αA(2αB − 1) + 2αB + 1]
(1 + 2Λ)2
The positivity of this quantity implies that θ˜FBA = θ˜FBB arises for a θ˜ larger than 1.
Hence, εA < ε˜B < 1 and θ˜FBA > θ˜FBB for all ε ∈ [0, ε˜B).
⇒ Step 2 – The case of corner solutions θFBA = 1 and θFBB ∈ (0, 1).
When ε > εA, θFBA = 1 and the value θ
FB
B which defines θFBB solves:
max
θB
αAp+ (1− p)(1− θB) + αB(1− p)[2θB − (θB)2]
+ε[αAp
2 + αB(1− p)2(θB)2 + (αA + αB)p(1− p)θB]
Then, the FOC is 2αB − 1− 2αB[1− ε(1− p)]θB + εp(αA + αB) = 0 and:
θ
FB
B =
2αB − 1 + εp(αA + αB)
2αB[1− ε(1− p)]
which is lower than 1 if and only if ε < εB = 1/(αB + Λ).
35
After computations ∂εθ
FB
B = [2αB − 1 + p(1 + αA − αB)]/[2αB[1 − ε(1 − p)]2] and
∂εεθ
FB
B = {(1 − p)[2αB − 1 + p(1 + αA − αB)]}/{αB[1 − ε(1 − p)]3}. Then, θ
FB
B is an
increasing and convex function of ε.
Comparing θG with θFBB we conclude that θG− θ
FB
B has the sign of (2Λ− 1)2αB[1−
ε(1 − p)] − 2Λ(1 − ε)[2αB − 1 + pε(αA + αB)], i.e., the sign of RB(ε) = 2p(αA +
αB)Λε
2 − 2[p(αA − αB)Λ + Λ− αB + pαB]ε+ 2(Λ− αB). As Λ− αB = p(αA − αB) we
obtain RB(ε) = 2pSB(ε) with SB(ε) = (αA +αB)Λε2− [αA + (αA−αB)Λ]ε+αA−αB.
As the discriminant ∆S of SB(ε) is ∆S = [αA − (αA − αB)Λ]2 + 4Λ(αA + αB)αB,
the polynomial function RB(ε) has two positive roots and the product of these roots
is given by piR = Λ(αA + αB)/(αA − αB). As piR ≥ αB(αA + αB)/(αA − αB) ≥
0.5(αA + 0.5)/(αA − 0.5) ≥ αA + 0.5 ≥ 1, RB(0) > 0 and RB(1) > 0, the two roots of
RB(ε) are larger than 1 and RB is positive for all ε ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, θG > θFBB .
⇒ Step 3 – Characterization and properties of the FB–equilibrium.
Using Step 1 and 2, it is straightforward to obtain that the FB–equilibrium (θFBA , θFBB ) ∈
(0, 1]× (0, 1] is given by:
θFBA =
 θ˜
FB
A if ε < εA
1 if ε ≥ εA
and θFBB =

θ˜FBB if ε < εA
θ
FB
B if εA ≤ ε < εB
1 if ε ≥ εB
In Step 1 we have established that θ˜FBA and θ˜FBB are both increasing and convex
functions of ε. In Step 2 we have established that θFBB is an increasing and convex
function of ε. Combining Step 1 and Step 2 we have also established that θFBA > θFBB ,
θFBA ≥ θLFA , θFBB ≥ θLFB , θG < θFBA and θG > θFBB . 2
Appendix G – Proof of Proposition 6.
We separately study the welfare of each type of individual.
⇒ Step 1 – Characterization of type A individuals’ welfare at the FB–
equilibrium.
We first focus on the welfare of type A individuals when ε < εA. Merging (6) and (7)
in Appendix F gives ε(αA+αB)θ̂ = 2−2αA−2αB+2αA(1−pε)θ˜A+2αB[1−(1−p)ε]θ˜B.
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Then, according to (7) and using the fact that 2αB[1− (1− p)ε]θ˜B = 2αB− 1 + ε(αA +
αB)pθ˜A we obtain (αA +αB)εθ̂ = [2αA− εp(αA−αB)]θ˜A− (2αA− 1). Thus, the utility
UFBA = 1− θ˜A + αA[2θ˜A − θ˜2A + εθ˜Aθ̂] becomes:
U˜FBA = 1 +
(
αB(2αA − 1)
αA + αB
)
θ˜FBA +
(
αA(αA − αB)(1− εp)
αA + αB
)
(θ˜FBA )
2
Then, U˜FBA = 1 +G(ε)/(αA +αB) with G(ε) = αB(2αA− 1)θ˜FBA +αA(αA−αB)(1−
εp)(θ˜FBA )
2. We obtain G′(ε) = ϑ(ε) + 2αA(αA − αB)(1 − εp)θ˜FBA ∂εθ˜FBA with ϑ(ε) =
αB(2αA − 1)∂εθ˜FBA − αAp(αA − αB)(θ˜FBA )2. Then, ϑ(ε) = [αB(2αA − 1)NA − αAp(αA −
αB)(u
FB
A )
2]/V 2. As NA ≥ 4αAαBuFBA |ε=1 and uFBA ≤ 2αB(2αA − 1) we have ϑ(ε) ≥
4αAα
2
B(2αA − 1)Π/V 2, with Π = uFBA |ε=1 − p(αA − αB)(2αA − 1) = (2αB − 1)(αA +
αB) + 2p(αA − αB)[1 − (αA − αB)]. Then ϑ(ε) ≥ 0. This implies G′(ε) > 0. As
∂εU˜A
FB
= G′(ε)/(αA + αB), U˜FBA increases in ε.
Moreover G′′(ε) = 2αA(αA−αB)(1− εp)[θ˜FBA ∂εεθ˜FBA + (∂εθ˜FBA )2] + ∆(ε) with ∆(ε) =
αB(2αA−1)∂εεθ˜FBA −4αA(αA−αB)pθ˜FBA ∂εθ˜FBA . Then ∆(ε) = δA/V 3 with δA = αB(2αA−
1)ξA−4αA(αA−αB)pNAuFBA . As uFBA ≤ 2αB(2αA−1), we have δA ≥ 2αB(2αA−1)p(1−
p)uFBA (αA−αB)2V + 4NAαB(2αA− 1)[2αAαB− p(αA−αB){αA +αB + p(αA−αB)}] ≥
2αB(2αA − 1)p(1 − p)uFBA (αA − αB)2V + 8NAαAαB(2αA − 1)(2αB − αA) > 0. Then,
G′′(ε) is positive. As ∂εεU˜FBA = G′′(ε)/(αA + αB), U˜FBA is a convex function of ε.
We now focus on type A individuals’ welfare when εA ≤ ε < ε˜G. As θFBA = 1, then
UFBA = αA(1 + εθ̂), with θ̂ = p+ (1− p)θ
FB
B . Thus, UFBA = αA[1 + εp+ (1− p)εθ
FB
B ]. As
θ
FB
B is a positive, increasing and convex function of ε, it is straightforward to establish
that UFBA is an increasing and convex function of ε.
⇒ Step 2 – Characterization of type B individuals’ welfare at the FB–
equilibrium.
We now focus on type B individuals’ welfare when ε < εA. Merging (6) and (7) in
Appendix F gives ε(αA +αB)θ̂ = 2−2αA−2αB + 2αA(1−pε)θ˜A + 2αB[1− (1−p)ε]θ˜B.
Then, according to (6) and using the fact that 2αA(1 − pε)θ˜A = 2αA − 1 + ε(αA +
αB)(1−p)θ˜B we obtain (αA+αB)εθ̂ = [2αB +ε(1−p)(αA−αB)]θ˜B− (2αB−1). Then,
the utility UFBB = 1− θ˜B + αB[2θ˜B − θ˜2B + εθ˜B θ̂] becomes:
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U˜FBB = 1 +
(
αA(2αB − 1)
αA + αB
)
θ˜FBB −
(
αB(αA − αB)[1− ε(1− p)]
αA + αB
)
(θ˜FBB )
2
Then, U˜FBB = 1 +H(ε)/(αA +αB) with H(ε) = αA(2αB − 1)θ˜FBB −αB(αA−αB)[1−
ε(1 − p)](θ˜FBB )2. After computations, H ′(ε) = αA(2αB − 1)∂εθ˜FBB + αB(αA − αB)(1 −
p)(θ˜FBB )
2 − 2[1 − ε(1 − p)]αB(αA − αB)θ˜FBB ∂εθ˜FBB . As θ˜FBB |ε=0 = ∂εθ˜FBB |ε=0 = (2αB −
1)/(2αB), we obtain after simplifying H ′(0) = (2αB− 1)[2αB− 1][2αA− (αA−αB)(1 +
p)]/(4αB). Therefore, H ′(0) > 0 and, by continuity, U˜FBB is an increasing function for
sufficiently low values of ε.
We now focus on type B individuals’ welfare when εA ≤ ε < ε˜G. Using the
fact that UFBB = 1 − θ
FB
B + αB[2θ
FB
B − (θ
FB
B )
2 + εθ
FB
B θ̂] with θ̂ = p + (1 − p)θ
FB
B we
obtain, after computations, UFBB = 1 + I(ε)/2 with I(ε) = θ
FB
B [2αB − 1 − pε(αA −
αB)]. Thus, I ′(ε) = ∂εθ
FB
B [2αB − 1 − εp(αA − αB)] − θ
FB
B p(αA − αB). As θ
FB
B |p=1 =
[2αB − 1 + ε(αA + αB)]/[2αB] and ∂εθFBB |p=1 = (αA − αB)/(2αB) we obtain, after
computations, I ′(ε)|p=1 = −εαA(αA − αB)/αB. Moreover, it is straightforward that
I ′(ε)|p=0 = (2αB − 1)(αA − αB)/(2αB). Then, I ′(ε)|p=0 > 0 and I ′(ε)|p=1 < 0 and, by
continuity, UFBB is an increasing function for sufficiently low values of p but a decreasing
one for sufficiently high values of p.
We now compare UFB with UG for type A individuals. It is straightforward to
establish that UFBA |ε=0 = ULFA |ε=0. Moreover, according to Proposition 3, UGA |ε=0 <
ULFA |ε=0. Then UFBA |ε=0 > UGA |ε=0. Similarly, UGA |ε=ε˜G = (1+ ε˜G)αA whereas UFBA |ε=ε˜G =
[1 + ε˜G(p+ (1− p)θB|FBε=ε˜G)]αA. As p+ (1− p)θB|FBε=ε˜G < 1 we have UGA |ε=ε˜G > UFBA |ε=ε˜G .
By continuity we have established that UFBA > UGA when ε is sufficiently low whereas
UFBA < UGA for sufficiently large values of ε.
We finally compare UFB with UG for type B individuals. It is straightforward to
establish that UFBB |ε=0 = ULFB |ε=0. Moreover, according to Proposition 4, UGB |ε=0 <
ULFB |ε=0. Hence, UFBB |ε=0 > UGB |ε=0. By definition of the First Best, we have for all
ε, pUFBA + (1 − p)UFBB ≥ pUGA + (1 − p)UGB . As UGA |ε=ε˜G > UFBA |ε=ε˜G , we necessarily
have UGB |ε=ε˜G > UFBB |ε=ε˜G . By continuity we have established that UFBB > UGB when ε is
sufficiently low or sufficiently large. 2
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